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“[W]arranties are favored in law, being a part of a man’s assurance.”1
ABSTRACT
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) recognizes both
express warranties and implied warranties of quality in the sale of goods.
Within specific limits, the UCC permits sellers to exclude or modify implied
warranties. When it comes to disclaiming express warranties, however, the
UCC is not so explicit. However, sellers of goods sometimes inquire about the
possibility of doing so and whether such disclaimers are enforceable. This
essay attempts to answer these questions.
The principle of freedom of contract posits that parties are free to reach

*

Kurt M. Saunders is Professor of Business Law, California State University, Northridge.
The author wishes to thank Leonard Rymsza for his contribution to an early draft of this essay.
The inspiration for this research was the countless number of times I have been asked this question
by my students. After answering it with more or less certainty over the years, I decided to
investigate it in-depth for the sake of my own curiosity.
1
EDWARD COKE & JOHN HENRY THOMAS, A SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE’S
FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, ON THE PLAN OF SIR MATTHEW HALE’S ANALYSIS;
WITH THE ANNOTATIONS OF MR. HARGRAVE, LORD CHIEF JUSTICE HALE, AND LORD
CHANCELLOR NOTTINGHAM; AND A NEW SERIES OF NOTES AND REFERENCES TO THE PRESENT
TIME – PRIMARY SOURCE EDITIONS 219–20 (Nabu Press 2013) (1818).
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contracts on mutually agreed terms.2 Most contracts for the sale of goods
include various warranties of quality. A warranty is a guarantee or promise by
the seller to the buyer that specific facts about the goods are true.3 Warranties
tend to become an issue of contention when the buyer becomes dissatisfied
with the goods after purchase. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code4
(UCC) recognizes both express warranties and implied warranties. Within
limits, the UCC permits sellers to exclude or modify implied warranties on the
goods they sell. Although the implied warranties of merchantability5 and
fitness for a particular purpose6 are imposed by operation of law, the UCC
provides specific requirements by which the seller can disclaim either of these
warranties.7
On occasion, a seller of goods will inquire about the possibility of
disclaiming an express warranty. Unlike implied warranties, an express
warranty is the result of a negotiated exchange between the buyer and seller.8
When it comes to disclaiming express warranties, however, the UCC is not so
explicit.9 Can a seller ever disclaim an express warranty? This essay attempts
to answer this question. In doing so, I first review how an express warranty
arises under Article 2 of the UCC. Next, I consider whether the UCC allows
for exclusions of express warranties and, if so, how this might be
accomplished. Finally, I assess the extent to which an express warranty
disclaimer would be enforceable.

2

Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598
(1969).
3
See JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 101(A) (5th ed. 2011).
4
U.C.C. §§ 2-313–2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
5
Id. § 2-314. In its most commonly understood form, an implied warranty of merchantability
requires that goods be “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” Id. § 2314(2)(c).
6
Id. §2-315. An implied warranty of fitness arises where the seller has reason to know of the
consumer’s specific purpose for which the goods are required and the consumer is relying on the
seller’s skill or judgment in selecting or furnishing goods for that purpose. Id. § 2-315.
7
Id. § 2-316. Any written warranty disclaimer must be conspicuous. Id. § 2-316(2). The
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose must be disclaimed in writing, while a
disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability must mention the term “merchantability.”
Id. Similarly, warranties may be disclaimed by “language which in common understanding calls
the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied
warranty.” Id. § 2-316(3)(a). Additionally, warranties will be effectively disclaimed when the
consumer examines, or is provided with an opportunity to examine the goods, or “by course of
dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.” Id. §§ 2-316(3)(b)–2-136(3)(c).
8
See Medical City Dallas, Ltd. v. Carlisle Corp., 251 S.W.3d 55, 63 (Tex. 2008).
9
Before the enactment of the UCC, the courts routinely allowed for the disclaimer of express
warranties on the basis of freedom of contract. See Note, Implied and Express Warranties and
Disclaimers Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 664 (1963).
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I. CREATION OF EXPRESS WARRANTIES
A seller may create an express warranty by an affirmative statement of
fact or promise regarding the goods being sold,10 through a description of the
goods,11 or by providing to the buyer a sample or model of the goods.12 An
express warranty will arise from any of these, provided it becomes part of the
basis of the bargain of the contract, and the goods must conform to the
description, promise, or model or sample.13 By making a promise or statement
of fact about the goods, or providing a description of the goods that are part of
the basis of the bargain of the contract, the seller creates an express warranty
that the goods will conform to the description.14 Similarly, the seller is
providing the buyer with a sample or model that becomes part of the basis of
the bargain between the parties. This creates an express warranty that “the
whole of the goods” will conform to the sample or model.15
Any of these become part of the basis of the bargain when the buyer
relies on the description, promise, or model or sample in making his or her
decision to purchase the goods. However, a consumer need not prove reliance
since all representations of quality by the seller become part of the basis of the
bargain unless “good reason is shown to the contrary.”16 Thus, the buyer’s
awareness of the seller’s representations at the time of their agreement is
sufficient to meet this requirement.17 In addition, the seller need not have a
specific intent to make a warranty or use words like “warrant” or “guarantee”
to create a warranty.18 However, statements by the seller relating to the value
or opinion of the goods will not create an express warranty.19 It is important to
differentiate statements of fact from statements of value or opinion. A
statement like “these are the best microprocessors around” or “these tires are a
great deal” are considered puffery or sales talk and do not create express

10

U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a).
Id. § 2-313(1)(b).
12
Id. § 2-313(1)(c).
13
Id. § 2-313(1)(a).
14
Id. § 2-313(1)(b).
15
Id. § 2-313(1)(c).
16
Id. § 2-313 cmt. 8. In essence, there is a rebuttable presumption that the description,
promise, or sample or model is part of the basis of the bargain between the parties.
17
Id. cmt. 3; see, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336 (Va. 1992); England
v. Leithoff, 323 N.W.2d 98 (Neb. 1982).
18
U.C.C. § 2-313(2). Likewise, it is not necessary for the seller to have any particular
experience in selling the goods at issue. See Ewers v. Eisenzopf, 276 N.W.2d 802 (Wis. 1979).
19
U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
11
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warranties.20
As can be seen, an express warranty goes to the essence of what the
seller has agreed to sell.21 An express warranty may be oral or written.22
Unlike implied warranties, which arise automatically and require no particular
statement or action by the seller,23 express warranties result from any
affirmative statement or action on the part of the seller relating to the quality or
characteristics of the goods.
II. DISCLAIMERS OF EXPRESS WARRANTIES
In broad terms, the UCC provides that endeavors to disclaim warranties
should be construed reasonably and enforced unless doing so would be
unreasonable under the circumstances.24 To allow a seller to disclaim an
express warranty that the seller freely promised would appear to be illogical.
As the comment to section 2-313 states: “‘Express warranties rest on
‘dickered’ aspects of the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of
that bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic
dickered terms.”25 The conclusion that an express warranty, once made, cannot
be disclaimed would appear to be indisputable.26
Nevertheless, the UCC permits a seller to disclaim an express warranty
through a confusing provision. Section 2-316 provides that wherever
reasonable, an express warranty and a disclaimer of any express warranty are
to be construed as consistent with each other.27 However, subject to the
provisions of the UCC on parol or extrinsic evidence,28 a disclaimer of an
express warranty “is inoperative to the extent that such construction is
20

See, e.g., Web Press Serv. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 525 A.2d 57 (Conn. 1987);
Guess v. Lorenz, 612 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
21
See UCC § 2-313 cmt. 4 (“[T]he whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what
it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell.”).
22
See id. § 2-202. If the express warranty is oral, it is possible that parol evidence rule issues
may arise. If the parties intend the written purchase agreement to be a final expression of their
agreement (i.e., intend the agreement to be fully integrated), then the parol evidence rule would
prohibit the introduction of evidence of an oral express agreement. See Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 103 F.3d 1281, 1286 (7th Cir. 1996).
23
See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 1 (implied warranties “rest so clearly on a common factual
situation or set of conditions that no particular language or action is necessary to evidence them
and they will arise in such a situation unless unmistakably negated”).
24
See U.C.C. § 2-316(1).
25
Id. § 2-313 cmt. 1.
26
See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 425 (5th ed.
2000); MURRAY, supra note 3, at § 101(E)(1).
27
See U.C.C. § 2-316.
28
Id. § 2-202.
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unreasonable.”29 Section 2-316 is designed to protect both the buyer and the
seller.30 To better understand how both the buyer and the seller are protected,
an analysis of four specific fact situations will be helpful.
The first situation involves an express warranty stated in the written
agreement that also contains a general disclaimer, such as “seller disclaims all
warranties” or “seller makes no warranties, either express or implied, with
respect to these goods.” In this instance, the general disclaimer is inoperative.
This result relies on a general rule of contract construction that when there is a
conflict between specific and general provisions in the written contract, the
specific provisions prevail.31 Giving effect to the general written disclaimer
provision over the specific express written warranty is unreasonable and
therefore the general disclaimer is inoperative.32
The second situation involves an express warranty stated in the written
agreement that also contains a specific disclaimer.33 In this instance, the
general rule of contract construction whereby a specific provision of the
agreement prevails over a general provision does not apply because there is a
head-to-head meeting of two specific provisions. However, the inclusion in the
written agreement of an express warranty and a specific disclaimer cannot be
construed as reasonably consistent with one another. In this case, section 2316(1) explicitly states “negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that
such construction is unreasonable.”34 The result in both the first and second

29

Id. § 2-316(1) (emphasis added).
See id. § 2-316 cmts. 1–2.
31
See id. § 2-316(1); see also id. § 2-316 cmt. 1. Comment 4 to section 2-313 further
provides: “[A] contract is normally a contract for a sale of something describable and described. A
clause generally disclaiming ‘all warranties, express or implied’ cannot reduce the seller’s
obligation with respect to such description and therefore cannot be given literal effect under
Section 2-316.” Id. § 2-313 cmt. 4; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(c)
(AM. LAW INST. 1981). The provisions of section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code relating
to parol or extrinsic evidence do not apply given that both the express warranty and the disclaimer
of the express warranty are included in the contract in writing. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (2014).
32
See U.C.C. § 2-316(1); see also Hayes v. Bering Sea Reindeer Prods., 983 P.2d 1280, 1286
(Alaska 1999) (“A seller cannot negate express warranties through generalized disclaimers.”);
Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Wis. 1978). But see Broomfield v.
Parker, No. 12-06-00208-CV, 2007 WL 677819, at *1, *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2007) (“as is”
clause in written contract served to disclaim implied and express warranties).
33
For instance, the contract represents that “this fabric is made of 100% cotton” or “seller
warrants that all components are new,” but includes a disclaimer stating “seller disclaims any
warranty that the fabric contains or is made of cotton” or “seller does not warrant that any
component is new.”
34
U.C.C. § 2-316(1). This approach focuses on the buyer’s expectations. If a reasonable
buyer would not expect or be surprised by the disclaimer, then it should not be enforceable. See
Robert A. Hillman, U.C.C. Article 2 Express Warranties and Disclaimers in the Twenty-First
Century, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 167, 171 (2009).
30
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situations is the same in that the disclaimer is inoperative.35
The third situation involves an express warranty not appearing in a
written agreement that contains a specific disclaimer of all oral express
warranties.36 Generally, in a situation such as this, the express warranty is
oral.37 In this instance, the seller’s specific disclaimer will prevail. The seller
will be able to rely upon the parol evidence rule contained in section 2-202 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, which reads, in pertinent part:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree
or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement . . . .38

The parol evidence rule would prevent the buyer from proving and
relying on the alleged oral express warranty.39 Thus, the oral express warranty
would be inconsistent with the disclaimer in a written agreement intended by
the parties as the final expression of their written agreement. Finally, the last
situation involves an express warranty not appearing in a written agreement
that contains a general disclaimer of all oral express warranties. As in the third
situation, the seller’s specific disclaimer will prevail. Again, the seller will be
able to rely upon the UCC’s parol evidence rule to prevent the buyer from

35

See Husky Spray Serv., Inc. v. Patzer, 471 N.W.2d 146, 152 (S.D. 1991) (holding that a
disclaimer of which buyer was unaware cannot exclude explicitly bargained-for express warranty).
But see Hayes, 983 P.2d at 1286, where the court gave effect to a specific disclaimer of an express
warranty because it was conspicuous in a contract between parties with equal bargaining power and
the buyer had ample opportunity to inspect the goods before purchase. See St. Croix Printing
Equip., Inc. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 428 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
36
For example, the seller orally states or promises: “the glass is shatterproof” or “this product
contains no artificial ingredients,” and the written agreement includes a disclaimer such as: “seller
makes no warranties, either express or implied” or “seller disclaims any oral representations about
the ingredients used in this product.”
37
See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 5. Comment 5 states that
[a] description need not be by words. Technical specifications, blueprints
and the like can afford more exact description than mere language and if
made part of the basis of the bargain goods must conform to them. Past
deliveries may set the description of quality, either expressly or impliedly by
course of dealing.
Id.
38
However, in order to rely on the rule the seller must establish that the terms of the
agreement between the parties are “set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement . . . .” Id. § 2-202.
39
See id. § 2-316 cmt. 2 (“The seller is protected under this Article against false allegations
of oral warranties by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence . . . .”).
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introducing parol or extrinsic evidence of any oral express warranties.40
This rationale served as the basis of the court’s holding in Boud v.
SDNCO, Inc.,41 which involved a contract to purchase a luxury yacht. The
contract included a disclaimer of any express warranty that might have been
created during the negotiation process.42 When the buyer discovered numerous
mechanical problems with the yacht, he sued to rescind the sale and argued that
the disclaimer was not binding.43 The court, however, ruled that he could not
avoid the effect of the parol evidence rule or claim that the parties agreed to
any terms other than those in the written contract.44 As such, any express
warranties were disclaimed.
Although the language in section 2-316(1) is cumbersome and on initial
reading appears illogical, a careful analysis of the section provides some
insight into the attempt on the part of the drafters to provide some protection to
both the buyer and the seller. If an express warranty is contained in the written
agreement, the buyer is provided with maximum protection from the effect of a
disclaimer. However, if the express warranty is not contained in the written
agreement, the seller is able to obtain maximum protection by complying with
the parol evidence provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.45 Even so, it is
probable that a disclaimer of an express warranty that is not conspicuous would
be regarded as unenforceable.46
III. EFFECTIVENESS OF EXPRESS WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS
Although it is possible in limited circumstances to disclaim an express
warranty, the effect of such disclaimers may be circumscribed. In Mobile
Housing, Inc. v. Stone,47 for instance, the buyers sought to rescind a contract
for the sale to them of a mobile home that did not conform to the purchase
agreement or the model shown and demonstrated to them.48 The seller relied
on a disclaimer in the contract and the parol evidence rule. However, the court
40

See id.
Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 54 P.3d 1131 (Utah 2002).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1135; see also Miller v. Hubbard-Wray Co., 630 P.2d 880 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
45
However, in order to rely on the rule the seller must establish that the terms of the
agreement between the parties are “set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement . . . .” Id. (quoting Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 72.2020 (West)).
46
See Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 416 A.2d 394 (N.J. 1980). It is also probable that
such a provision will be strictly construed against the seller. See Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Co., 199 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
47
Mobile Hous., Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973).
48
Id. at 611–13.
41
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examined the language of the parol evidence rule and concluded that both
parties must intend for the writing to be a “final expression of their
agreement.”49 According to the court, since the buyers intended that the
mobile home would conform to the model and the description given by the
seller, it could not be seriously contended that the written contract was
intended to be the final expression of the parties’ agreement.50
In addition, there are further avenues that may afford defenses to the
enforcement of express warranty disclaimers. This section explores whether a
party against whom a disclaimer would be enforced can assert arguments based
on fraud and misrepresentation, unconscionability, or state unfair trade
practices and consumer protection statutes to negate the enforceability of the
disclaimer.
A. Fraud and Misrepresentation
Where a seller has made oral statements or promises of fact about the
goods sufficient to create an express warranty and later disclaimed them in the
written contract, the buyer may be able to void the contract on the basis of
fraud and misrepresentation if he relied on those statements or promises. A
misrepresentation is an untrue statement of fact rather than an opinion.51 The
party seeking to avoid the contract must also prove that he actually and
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation of fact in deciding to enter into the
contract.52 Reliance is not justifiable if the assertion is obviously false.53 The
contract will be voidable regardless of whether the misrepresentation was
fraudulent because it was intentionally deceptive, or innocent and not made
with knowledge of its falsity or intent to deceive.54 In addition to the remedy
of avoidance, the party may have a claim for damages caused by the
misrepresentation.55
A seller who has made representations creating an express warranty and
49

U.C.C. § 2-202.
Stone, 490 S.W.2d at 615; accord Miller, 630 P.2d 880.
51
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The
nondisclosure or concealment of a material fact is considered to be the equivalent of an affirmative
misrepresentation. Id. § 161. The distinction between statements of fact versus opinion is not
always clear, but should be based on whether the seller has sufficient knowledge to make an
assertion rather than express a mere belief. See MURRAY, supra note 3, at § 96[2].
52
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (alterations in
original).
53
Id. § 164 cmt. d.
54
See id.
55
Id. § 376. No election of remedies is required in contracts for the sale of goods. See
U.C.C. § 2-271.
50
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who seeks to disclaim the warranty is likely to rely on the parol evidence rule
to exclude such representations as contradicting the language of the written
contract.56 However, many courts have recognized a fraud exception to the
parol evidence rule.57 If the buyer can establish that the seller did not intend to
abide by an oral express warranty when it was made, then parol evidence of
prior oral promises or representations will be admissible to prove fraud.58 For
example, in George Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland Bros. Co.,59 the
seller of an airplane represented that it was in perfect condition and capable of
transporting cargo of 40,000 pounds a distance of 2,700 miles. The written
contract contained a disclaimer. When these statements proved to be false, the
buyer sued for damages and argued that the seller had made fraudulent
representations of material facts.60 The court held that parol evidence was
admissible to prove fraud in the inducement of the contract “even though the
written contract contains covenants waiving warranties or disclaiming or
limiting liabilities.”61
B. Unconscionability
The doctrine of unconscionability enables courts to refuse to enforce

56
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also
U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N, amended 2001).
57
See Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114, 119 (3d Cir.
1965) (explaining that the parol evidence rule does not apply to evidence of prior oral agreements
when fraud or mistake is averred); Alling v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 733–34
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that parol evidence is admissible to show promissory fraud, only
if "the false promise is either independent of or consistent with the written instrument"). Indeed,
“UCC § 1-103 states that ‘[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to . . . fraud [or]
misrepresentation . . . shall supplement its provisions.’” Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d at 119
(alteration in original) (quoting U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1952),
amended by U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2001)).
58
See George Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland Bros. Co., 255 S.E.2d 682, 683 (Va.
1979) (explaining that an express warranty can be admissible to prove a contract was induced by
fraud); see also Associated Hardware Supply Co., 355 F.2d at 119 (explaining that oral agreements
can be admissible to prove fraud).
59
George Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland Bros. Co., 255 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 1979).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 683; accord Fecik v. Capindale, 54 Pa. D. & C.2d 701 (C.P. 1971); Renaissance
Acres, LLC v. Schmidy’s Mach. Co., No. 217-2010-CV-220, 2011 N.H. Super. LEXIS 42, at 10–
11 (July 18, 2011); cf. Universal Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co., 737 F.2d 869, 873 (10th Cir.
1984) (recognizes the parol evidence fraud exception, but finds that it does not apply here since the
buyer did not rely on the fraudulent representations). For a further discussion of relationship
between the law of misrepresentation and express warranty disclaimers, see Elizabeth Cumming,
Balancing the Buyer’s Right to Recover for Precontractual Misstatements and the Seller’s Ability
to Disclaim Express Warranties, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1189 (1992).
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contracts or contract clauses that they find to be unconscionable and to prevent
oppression and unfair surprise.62 Section 2-302(1) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which incorporates the doctrine of unconscionability, provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.63

The analysis of unconscionability is frequently distinguished by form:
procedural versus substantive unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability
is concerned with the process of contract formation and focuses on such factors
as unequal bargaining power, lack of meaningful choice, pressured situations,
conspicuousness of contract terms, and the consumer’s level of education,
experience, or economic status.64 Substantive unconscionability arises when
the contract is found to contain overly harsh or one-sided terms such as
excessive price terms, or remedy exclusions or limitations.65 Most courts will
not void a contract or contract clause unless they find both substantive and
procedural unconscionability.66
Unconscionability may be an effective countermeasure against the
application of express warranty disclaimers because such “disclaimer[s] . . .
significantly reduce a warranty protection available under the Uniform
Commercial Code with the potentially harsh consequence[s]” to the
consumer.67 Moreover, consumers rarely understand the effect of disclaimers
and are often in no position to bargain to have such provisions removed from
the purchase agreement.68 As a consequence, express warranty disclaimers
may be characterized by both substantive and procedural unconscionability.
For example, the buyers in Eckstein v. Cummins69 sued for damages and
to rescind a contract for the purchase of an automobile plagued by defects
62

U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2014). The issue of unconscionability presents a question of law
for the court rather than an issue of fact for the jury. Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 528 P.2d
992, 995 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975).
63
U.C.C. § 2-302(1). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW
INST. 1981).
64
See MURRAY, supra note 3, at § 97(2)(b).
65
See id.
66
E.g., Clark v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 706 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); Harris
v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999).
67
Kurt M. Saunders, Unconscionability as “Lemon Aid,” 6 PACE L. REV. 195, 202 (1986)
(discussing warranty disclaimers in the context of defective “lemon” automobiles).
68
See id.
69
321 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).
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incapable of repair. The contract contained a disclaimer of express and implied
warranties.70 On appeal, the court upheld the trial court’s conclusion that the
disclaimer was unconscionable.71 As the court explained:
To place the purchaser of a defective vehicle incapable of repair in the
anomalous position of having no actionable claim for relief pursuant to the
strict language of the express warranty and disclaimer therein, because the
precise nature of the defect cannot be determined and the plaintiff cannot
identify any defective part, the replacement of which could remedy in defect,
would be to defeat the very purpose of the warranty which had been given to
the purchaser.72

As a caveat, it must be noted that the holding in Eckstein may be an
exception. Most courts have been hesitant to apply unconscionability to
invalidate disclaimers of implied warranties with the exception of cases
involving personal injuries to consumers.73 It is likely that a number of courts
would be similarly reluctant to exclude express warranty disclaimers on the
basis of unconscionability unless the case involved personal injury.74
C. Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes
As to consumers, another potential impediment to the enforcement of
express warranty disclaimers is state deceptive trade practices and consumer
protection statutes. Many such statutes are based on the Uniform Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law,75 which proscribes unfairness and
deception in commercial sales transactions.76 Most of these laws authorize
private enforcement actions and remedies, and empower the state attorney
general to adopt rules and regulations and to seek civil penalties for
violations.77
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See, e.g., Wilke v. Woodhouse Ford, Inc., 774 N.W.2d 370 (Neb. 2009).
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For further discussion of unconscionability and disclaimers of warranties, see Michael J.
Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
199 (1985); Richard A. Lord, Some Further Thoughts About Warranty Law: Express and Implied
Warranties, 56 N.D. L. REV. 510, 545–46 (1980).
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The Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law was jointly drafted by the
Federal Trade Commission and the Committee on Suggested State Legislation of the Council of
State Governments. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 1967 A71–
A78 (1967) (text of the statute).
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Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really LittleFTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163 (2011).
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Other states have adopted the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act,78
the purpose of which is to protect “consumers from suppliers who commit
deceptive and unconscionable sales practices.”79 Section 3(10) of the Act
defines a deceptive act or practice to arise when a seller indicates “that a
consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, [or] a disclaimer
of warranties … if the indication is false[.]”80 This section prohibits
misrepresentations to a consumer “that a warranty is unconditional . . . .”81 If a
seller has made representations about the goods, which are not true, or has
misrepresented the rights, remedies, or obligations of either the consumer or
the seller, the consumer can rescind the sale or sue for treble damages, plus
attorney’s fees, regardless of any disclaimers of warranties or parol evidence.82
Some courts have applied such statutes to hold that warranty disclaimers
and remedy limitations are unfair or unconscionable practices. The case of
Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes83 involved a defective and unmerchantable truck that
had been sold under an express warranty which limited the consumer’s remedy
to repair or replacement. The truck could not be adequately repaired within a
reasonable period of time and the buyers sued.84 On appeal, the court affirmed
a jury verdict finding that the manufacturer’s refusal to recognize the
consumer’s right to revoke acceptance and receive a refund was, under such
circumstances, unlawful under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act.85
According to the court, “[b]y insisting that its only liability was to repair or
replace defective parts even when the defects could not be corrected within a
reasonable time, Ford would use the strict language of the express warranty to
deprive [the buyers] of the benefits of their purchase.” 86

78
See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623–50-679a (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01–
1345.13 (LexisNexis 1979); 1953 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-1 to 13-11-23 (LexisNexis 1985).
See generally UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT, § 7A (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1970),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/consumer%20sales%20practices/MCSA71.pdf.
79
7A U.L.A. § 1(2) (1997).
80
Id. § 3(b)(10); e.g., Brown v. Lyons, 332 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1974).
81
7A U.L.A. § 3(b)(10) cmt. (1997). Such an act or practice is treated as per se deceptive.
Id. § 3(b) cmt.
82
See id. § 11.
83
575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 486; see also Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 676 P.2d 744 (Kan. 1984); Evans
v. Graham Ford, Inc., 442 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
86
575 S.W.2d at 485. The court added: “Because the truck could not be repaired within a
reasonable time, Ford acted ‘unconscionably’ when it insisted that [the buyers] had no remedy
other than to allow Ford and its dealer to continue indefinitely in their efforts to correct the
problem.” Id. at 486.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is not always the disingenuous seller who desires to disclaim an
express warranty. A seller may want to provide a limited written warranty and
therefore employ a disclaimer to maintain a standard set of terms for all such
warranties.87 Alternatively, there is the concern that sales agents will make
unauthorized oral statements or promises creating express warranties that will
be binding on the seller.88 In either situation, the seller might consider
including an express warranty disclaimer in the contract as a reasonable
business practice.
Although the language of section 2-316(1) is not a model of clarity, it
appears to prohibit disclaimers of express warranties by denying effect to such
language when inconsistent with the language of an express warranty in a
written contract. On the other hand, it may be easier for sellers to exclude oral
express warranties by relying on the parol evidence rule and including a merger
clause which states that the written contract constitutes the complete and final
agreement between the parties. In these instances, it is likely that a
conspicuous disclaimer of an oral express warranty would be regarded as
enforceable.89
Nevertheless, in such cases, a disappointed buyer who wishes to avoid
the effect of an express warranty disclaimer is not without recourse. He or she
may find support for negating the effect of the disclaimer in such theories as
the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule, the doctrine of
unconscionability, or by way of remedies available in state deceptive trade
practices and consumer protection statutes.
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This could arise in a sale involving the sale of a consumer product pursuant to a written
warranty and governed by the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312.
88
In such circumstances, the principal would be bound by the express warranty on the basis
of the agent’s implied actual authority as inferred from the agent’s express actual authority to make
representations about the goods to prospective buyers. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW
OF AGENCY § 2.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
89
This result stands in contrast with how such a disclaimer would be treated under the U.N.
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18 (1980),
reprinted in S. TREATY DOC. No. 9, 98th Cong., (1st Sess. 1993). Article 35 of the CISG requires
that the goods conform to certain implied representations that are similar to the express and implied
warranties of quality recognized by the UCC, “[e]xcept where the parties have agreed otherwise.”
CISG art. 35(2). This suggests that sellers are easily able to disclaim express warranties as part of
the agreement. However, the enforceability of a disclaimer of an express representation depends
on whether the buyer was aware of it at the time of contracting, or would have purchased the goods
had he or she known of the disclaimer. See Kurt M. Saunders, Contract Formation and
Performance under the UCC and CISG: A Comparative Case Study, 32 J. LEG. STUD. EDUC. 1, 21,
39 (2015).

